Avian influenza, or 'bird 'flu' arrived in Norfolk in April 2006 in the form of the low pathogenic strain H7N3. In February 2007 a highly pathogenic strain, H5N1, which can pose a risk to humans, was discovered in Suffolk. We examine how a local newspaper reported the outbreaks, focusing on the linguistic framing of biosecurity. Consistent with the growing concern with securitisation among policymakers, issues were discussed in terms of space (indoor-outdoor; local-global; national-international) and flows (movement, barriers and vectors) between spaces (farms, sheds and countries). The apportioning of blame along the lines of 'them and us' -Hungary and Englandwas tempered by the reporting on the Hungarian operations of the British poultry company. Explanations focused on indoor and outdoor farming and alleged breaches of biosecurity by the companies involved. As predicted by the idea of securitisation, risks were formulated as coming from outside the supposedly secure enclaves of poultry production.
Introduction
T he threat to animal and human health posed by avian influenza has been in the news since the end of 2004 (Nerlich and Halliday 2007) and has been of considerable concern to policymakers, journalists and the public. Fears of a 'flu pandemic in humans, if the animal virus were to mutate, increased in the summer of 2005 when both Russia and Kazakhstan reported outbreaks of avian influenza, or so-called bird 'flu in poultry in late July, which were confirmed as H5N1 in early August. Outbreaks in both countries were attributed to contact between domestic birds and wild waterfowl via shared water sources. In August 2005 The Times published an article entitled 'Norfolk: a bird flu landing place?' in which two well-known experts, Professors John Oxford and Hugh Pennington, warned that Norfolk could be at risk from migrating birds (The Times 2005) . The autumn of 2005 saw heightened anxiety about bird 'flu throughout the world and this continued in early 2006 when bird 'flu outbreaks occurred in Turkey, France and Germany and when a Whooper swan infected with H5N1 was found in Scotland.
In this context biosecurity has become a central concern for governments all over the world. The concept has assumed a variety of meanings and, as Hinchcliffe and Bingham (2008) have recently pointed out, it 'speaks to a range of concerns and a variety of practices ' (p. 1535) . They list three areas in which the term is currently used. The first is linked to 'attempts to manage the movement of agricultural pests and diseases' (Hinchcliffe and Bingham 2008, p. 1535.) . In accordance with the concerns of this special issue, this will also be the focus of our article. However, while many social scientists have now studied emerging practices and policies around biosecurity and disease control (Donaldson and Murakami Wood 2007 ; see Bingham and Hinchliffe 2008; Collier et al. 2004; Hinchcliffe and Bingham 2008; Hinchcliffe et al. 2008; Lakoff and Collier 2008) , and while some use the spatial metaphors of movements, flows, circulation and barriers, there is as yet no in-depth study of the language in which issues around biosecurity and the movement of agricultural diseases are discussed in the media, in policy documents and by practitioners. This gap is filled here, at least to some extent, by studying biosecurity narratives around outbreaks of avian 'flu in 2006 and 2007 in East Anglia within a methodological and theoretical framework provided by a combination of critical metaphor analysis and securitisation research.
In an era where heightened sensitivity to risk dominates policymakers' agendas (Beck 1992 (Beck , 1997 , public policy discourse has been deemed to be increasingly preoccupied with 'securitisation' (Ibrahim 2005; Adamson 2006 ). Security measures are justified by reference to threats from outside the boundaries of the nation state (Bigo 2002; Hyndman 2007 ). This particular theme often centres upon a rhetorical contrast between the outside, which is deemed to be dangerous, and the inside, which is locked down tightly, secured and safe (Chilton 1996) . In this formulation, 'practices of border control do not simply defend the "inside" from the threats "outside," but continually produce our sense of the insiders and outsiders in the global political economy' (Amoore and de Goede 2005, p. 168) . These concerns have also been major topics for linguistic investigation at the interface between critical metaphor analysis and security policy research (Thornborrow 1993; Chilton 1996; Charteris-Black 2006) . As Charteris-Black has pointed out with regard to Chilton's research (2006, p. 575 
):
Chilton argues convincingly for the importance and pervasiveness of spatial metaphors in relation to political discourse. He argues for a container schema in which 'what is inside is close to the self, and what is outside is also outside the law'. He also refers to 'a spatial containment schema' which grounds conceptualisations of one's country as a closed container that can be sealed or penetrated.
These concerns with securitisation and the distinctions between inside and outside are equally prominent in discussions of movements of non-human life, including poultry and disease organisms.
Bird 'flu arrived in Norfolk in April 2006 in the form of the low pathogenic strain H7N3. A year later in February 2007 it returned, this time to Suffolk, in the form of the highly pathogenic strain H5N1 which can pose a risk to humans. Both outbreaks were brought under control relatively quickly but raised questions about the transmission routes of the virus, the causes of the outbreaks and biosecurity, which can refer, especially in the UK and since the outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in 2001, to simple cleansing and disinfecting, but also to powerful systems of surveillance (Donaldson and Wood 2004) .
The outbreaks also stimulated debates about who was most at risk and who was the most likely transmitter of bird 'flu and therefore to blame for the outbreaks -'outdoor' flocks (including free-range farms and backyard flocks) or 'indoor' flocks (intensively reared poultry, including barn and battery flocks, for example). On the one hand, wild birds crossing national boundaries and spreading the virus to outdoor flocks were regarded by many as the most logical transmission route for the virus. The British Poultry Council says, for example that outdoor 'flocks under free-range and organic systems are at serious risk of infection' (British Poultry Council 2001) . On the other hand, the second outbreak, which occurred in a factory farm, made some question the notion that wild birds are the main vectors of virus transmission and argue that intensive poultry farming, long-distance poultry transports and the global trade in poultry products are mainly to blame for the spread of bird 'flu. The Soil Association, the UK's leading environmental charity promoting 'sustainable, organic farming and championing human health', contends, for example, that 'the spotlight' should be 'on industrial-scale globally-traded intensive poultry production' (Soil Association 2007). The issue of bird 'flu and biosecurity has therefore divided people not only along national and international lines, but also along ideological and financial lines (big companies versus small farmers; organic versus intensive farming).
This article draws on regional news coverage in the Eastern Daily Press as well as a variety of governmental sources to explore how metaphors inform discourses of biosecurity in relation to two outbreaks of avian 'flu in 2006 and 2007. In doing so we explore how notions of space and spatiality are central to notions of security and how the sense of boundaries between what is inside and outside is manifested in accounts of infection control.
Furthermore, we seek to link these to more general formulations of securitisation which are found elsewhere in contemporary debates about policy and risk management.
The two outbreaks -an overview
Norfolk 2006 According to a detailed epidemiological report issued by the Department for Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2006), three holdings, consisting of two free-range layer chicken flocks and one broiler breeder chicken flock were infected with the low pathogenic avian influenza type H7N3 in April 2006. No other evidence of infection was found in any associated premises or any other potentially exposed premises within 3 km of these holdings. Infection is believed to have arrived at the first infected premises between 17 and 20 March 2006. The source is believed to have been wild birds that have direct access to this outdoor flock. Infection is believed to have arrived at the second infected premises between 2-5 April 2006 with transmission occurring through shared personnel or equipment. Infection is believed to have arrived at the third infected premises (an indoor flock), and the first to be reported, between 15 and 18 April 2006 (DEFRA 2006) .
As the epidemiological report pointed out, the mortality rate at the indoor broiler farm was high and therefore aroused suspicion, whereas mortality at the free-range outdoor farms had been relatively low. This sparked renewed debate as to whether free-range poultry is more resistant or can tolerate viruses better than intensively farmed chicken. Based on the available evidence, transmission occurred possibly by foxes carrying carcasses and the introduction of virus to the housed birds through fomites (inanimate objects or substances capable of spreading infection) spread on contaminated footwear. The report of DEFRA's investigation concludes that biosecurity measures should include preventing the predation of dead birds by free-living species such as foxes and advocates that foxes should not be deliberately fed with poultry carcases. This last conclusion of the report provoked debate in the Norfolk farming community along the lines that no farmer would be stupid enough to feed dead chicken to foxes, which would thereby be attracted to the premises. One farmer, interviewed by the Eastern Daily Press poured scorn on the suggestion in DEFRA's final report that the infection had been spread to another farm in North Tuddenham by a fox taking an infected carcass from their farm -saying that in five weeks of investigation animal health workers were unable to find a single dead chicken on the premises (see Hannan 2006) . Various surveillance and restriction zones were set up and culling began on 27 and 30 April. The restrictions were lifted on 26 May. It took until October 2006 for the farms to be fully restocked.
Suffolk 2007
The full epidemiological report published by DEFRA on 20 April 2007 (DEFRA 2007) found that a highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus was confirmed in a turkey finishing unit in Holton in Suffolk owned by Bernard Matthews, one of the best known British turkey farmers (see Bernard Matthews Farms n.d.), on 3 February following increased mortality and suspicion of disease reported on 1 February. As a result the necessary arrangements were made for a full epidemiological investigation. This started on 3 February, when a further virological examinations revealed the virus to be of Asian lineage and molecular genetic studies showed that the nucleotide sequence of the HA gene, one of eight genes, was identical to that of the isolate of HP H5N1 AI virus from an outbreak in domestic geese in Hungary in January 2007 (DEFRA 2007a) .
As a result a 3 km protection zone, a 10 km surveillance zone and a restricted zone encompassing 2,000 km 2 were set up. A total of 159,000 turkeys were slaughtered and the cull was completed on 5 February. The outbreak was confined to a single farm adjacent to a turkey factory comprising a slaughterhouse and two processing plants (DEFRA 2007a) . The plant was disinfected, with cleaning complete on 12 February, and permission was given for production to resume (Smith 2007) . On 14 February 2007 some Bernard Matthews' turkey products were cleared by the Food Standards Agency to be released for sale. On 1 March 2007 housing restrictions around the plant were lifted, meaning that turkeys no longer had to stay indoors. The wider 10 km surveillance zone remained in place. All remaining control measures were lifted on 12 March.
Initially officials from the plant were reported as extolling the excellence of the biosecurity measures adhered to, but later on stories of other officials criticising the plant for serious biosecurity failings and lapses in hygiene appeared. Despite an extensive investigation there was insufficient evidence for prosecuting Bernard Matthews and he received around £600,000 in compensation on 20 April 2007 (BBC News 2007).
During the outbreak newspapers reported that Bernard Matthews had been importing 38 tons of partly processed turkey meat from their Saga Foods company in Sárvár, Hungary to a processing plant next to the farm in Holton (see Clover 2007) . Although Saga Foods lies 265 km from an outbreak of avian 'flu that had occurred in geese in the south of the country, in Sventes, a company director admitted that it was possible that some of the meat could have come from the exclusion zone and Whitehall expressed concern over biosecurity. DEFRA's (2007a) final report into the outbreak revealed that 60 kg of turkey breast meat imported from Hungary had been dumped on 15 January in open bins outside the UK processing plant and had provided easy pickings for rats and wild birds. It is thought that this meat was originally from birds slaughtered at Kecskemét, close to farms where the infected geese had been found on 14 January. Therefore, the most plausible, but unproven, explanation for the events at Holton is that these birds may have been carrying the virus without showing signs of disease (DEFRA 2007a) . Two reports, one by DEFRA and one led by the Food Standards Agency found 'no evidence that any meat entered the UK food chain from the restricted zones in Hungary' (see Food Standards Agency 2007).
The 2007 outbreak differed from the 2006 one in that it involved a poultry processing unit, not only a farm, as it was caused by H5N1 not H7N3. It was highly poignant that the virus found its way into a Bernard Matthews plant, just as it had done in 1992, the last time before 2007 that H5N1 had struck a British poultry flock. In a metonymical chain the outbreak tainted the reputation of Bernard Matthews himself, his plant, his flock and his products, and also the space and place that had made them famous.
Conceptual framework, material and methods
Spatial terms, especially spatial prepositions, can be used both literally and metaphorically, as in phrases like 'they are in the shed' and 'they are in danger'; 'they stood before him' and 'she put her child before herself'; 'the fence was high' and 'biosecurity was high'. One aspect of the spatial use of language can be studied through the analysis of what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have called orientational metaphors. Such conceptual metaphors, they argue, structure how we think about the world, especially about issues of time (as in 'we are running out of time', 'think before you speak'), but also about social and moral issues (Boers 1996; Chilton 1996; Tenbrink 2007 can give rise to utterances such as 'I am on cloud nine', 'he is down in the dumps', 'lowering biosecurity measures will lead to disaster' and so on. The conceptual metaphors on which such expressions are based are themselves rooted in various image schema such as: CONTAINER, for example, border, inner, outer, FLUIDS, for example, flow, stream, current and PATH, for example, path, towards, along, forward (Chilton 1996) . The container schema can be mapped, for example, onto a nation or a country, a farm or a shed (losing its metaphorical quality along the way, as sheds are literally containers). Viruses, for example, can be conceived as flooding into the UK (a metaphorical container) (Law 2006 ) along various paths and as part of a variety of other, more literal, containers or carriers, for example, poultry, wild birds, foxes, humans and lorries. In this respect, there are various aspects of space that can be exploited to talk about 'the ins and outs' of biosecurity: distance (close, far), containment (holding something in, keeping something out), boundary (lines between in and out, transitions), movement, direction, speed and acceleration, a path or journey that is traced through space.
Lexis Nexis Professional was used to search one regional newspaper, the Eastern Daily Press between January 2006 and 12 March 2007 (when all restrictions pertaining to the second outbreak were lifted) using the key word 'bird 'flu'. A total of 83 articles were retrieved (31 pertaining to the 2006 outbreak 52 to the 2007 one. Nine articles from 2006 had to be discarded as they only mentioned bird 'flu in passing). We selected a local paper covering the areas where the outbreaks occurred because its local focus means that the coverage of the events, personalities and twists and turns of the story is likely to be more detailed than in the national press. In addition, in the case of events like these, the national media may well take up issues that were first broached in local newspapers (Gorman and Mclean 2002) . Thus, a local paper focus will give us clues as to how the issues were originally formulated.
The corpus was subjected to close reading and literal and metaphorical spatial expressions were retrieved and sorted into themes. In the Eastern Daily Press many of the news stories examined the uncertainty surrounding the transmission route of the virus and, in the spirit of securitisation described above, debated various vectors of virus transmission and discussed the 'barriers' imposed to stop the spread, including biosecurity. Another focus of debate, in line with the concern over movements across boundaries and borders in many security discourses, was the movement between (in and out of) spaces, including other nations, farm premises, processing plants and poultry sheds. Biosecurity was a central topic in the media coverage and in government investigations of the outbreak, with the issues discussed in terms of space (indoor-outdoor, local-global, national-international) and flows (movement, barriers, vectors) between spaces (such as farms, sheds and countries). Activities that count as biosecurity were also discussed more concretely in terms of mapping the transmission of the virus, the actions taken to keep it contained and various hypotheses about virus transmission onto actions, agents and objects, such as wild birds, foxes, humans, clothes, sheds, national borders, fences and so on. The language of space in relation to risk, blame and biosecurity was therefore chosen as the focus of this article.
Results based on such a small sample and one case study can obviously not be generalised and further research into the topic of biosecurity and space is needed. However, the results achieved provide some indication of the state of public debate regarding biosecurity at two crucial points in time, that is, when the UK experienced one minor and one major outbreak of bird 'flu.
Analysis: biosecurity, space and language

Biosecurity: ideal and reality
Although the term biosecurity was used during both outbreaks of avian 'flu, the low-pathogenic one in Norfolk in 2006 and the high-pathogenic one in Suffolk in 2007, there was, in both cases, a difference between what one might call aspirational biosecurity, an image of biosecurity that is evoked by most farmers and implemented by some, and what is happening on the ground. This ideal of biosecurity was beautifully expressed in an article published during the outbreak of low-pathogenic avian 'flu in 2006, when avian 'flu was actually much more on people's mind than at the beginning of 2007, when interest had begun to wane:
From the back-garden enthusiast to the professional producer, strict biosecurity measures have become the key to preventing the arrival of bird flu in East Anglia.... As each bird flu case has been confirmed -in France and then Germany, it has reinforced the strict biosecurity and hygiene precautions taken by the poultry industry in this country. (Prekopp 2006) Here biosecurity is conceptualised as an activity around 'keeping the virus out of the country' or preventing it from spreading from 'other' countries to 'our' country. The threat of bird 'flu is seen spatially, as moving in gradually and biosecurity is seen as a barrier erected to keep the invader out, rather than being conceptualised as a result of or as being inherent to the various systems of poultry production themselves.
Biosecurity and modernity: forward or backward, high or low
The same article quotes a farmer and Farmer's Union spokesman on avian 'flu, who was frequently interviewed in 2006 and 2007. Shortly after the 2006 outbreak, he pointed out that It is standard that all poultry units follow the same 'all in, all out' approach. A new flock is introduced into a clean, disinfected and completely empty building and then after each batch, the cycle starts again.... For the organic and free-range producer, the prospect of bird flu will cause bigger headaches if birds have to be taken inside. (Prekopp 2006) Cleanliness and hygiene are key elements of 'high' standards of biosecurity, and they are, by some, linked to modernity, whereas lapses in biosecurity or 'low' standards of biosecurity and the associated risks of spreading disease are projected onto 'the other' (Joffe 1999) and onto the past -that is 'backwards', both in space, time and the social groups involved. As one director of a company at the centre of the first outbreak told a reporter: 'biosecurity is our Bible here ... It's not like we are eating and sleeping with the chickens in this country' (Prekopp 2006) -something that was blamed for the spread of bird 'flu in 'other' ('backward') countries, especially in the Far East, but also later on in Turkey, for example, where bird 'flu claimed human victims in the very poorest parts of the country.
This indicates that issues of proximity and distance are as important in biosecurity as cleanliness and hygiene -and this on various levels: proximity between birds and humans, as highlighted in this quote, but also, and more importantly, proximity between birds and other wildlife, an issue that was discussed throughout the two outbreaks; and, as it turned out, proximity between poultry and poultry. The issue of inside and outside or indoors and outdoors became a central debating point in both outbreaks, especially the suspected 'contamination' of the modern, indoor (high biosecurity) flocks by the old-fashioned, perhaps even backward, outdoor (low biosecurity) flocks.
Conceptualisations organised around the up-down dimension and the near-far dimension were dominant ways of conceptualising biosecurity in ordinary discourse (as reported in the media). In this context conceptual metaphors such as HEALTH AND
LIFE ARE UP, SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN, HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE ARE UP, BEING
SUBJECTED TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN, not only have implications for how we think and talk about biosecurity; they also have normative associations and frame policy options. From the (dominant) perspective of industrialised farming, high biosecurity is associated with health, control, modernity and rationality and low biosecurity with disease, loss of control, backwardness and irrationality, whereas from the point of view of (the less dominant) organic or free-range farming the high biosecurity advocated by industrial farmers is believed to lead to disease by lowering the immunity of birds.
The indoors-outdoors and inside-outside conundrum
In line with the broader pattern of discourses surrounding security and securitisation, the threat from avian 'flu comes from elsewhere (Booth 2005 ) and movements and migrations are regarded with suspicion (Turner 2007) . Thus, for some time, the threat of avian 'flu to British poultry flocks had been mainly conceptualised as a journey whereby the virus would migrate from east to west, carried along a trajectory or path traced 'in the sky' above by migrating birds and sometimes 'landing' on the outdoor ground or soil. Outdoor flocks were therefore regarded as being at higher risk from bird 'flu than factory-farmed flocks that are kept inside the securitised boundary, indoors and under cover. As one farmer said during the 2007 outbreak: 'The current thinking is that it is mostly carried by wild birds, so the birds that are most at risk will be outside.' (Proctor 2007a). The risk of bird 'flu is conceptualised as coming from the outside in, from above to the ground and from the 'wild' to the 'farmed'. Biosecurity is regarded as being important indoors as well as out, but is conceived as being of a 'higher' standard in indoor environments.
This view of the spread of the virus, what one can call the dominant hypothesis, seemed to be confirmed by the outbreak in 2006 that may have begun in a free-range flock, as pointed out in the DEFRA report. However, the outbreak was first reported in an 'indoor flock' where the mortality rate had increased. At this stage, one farmer whose own free-range farms were later also found to be infected, said on 28 April, 2006: 'It is a hell of a blow to the people who have got the farm that is involved'. He said it was a mystery how the virus got on to the farm as the flock was kept under cover ' (Prekopp 2006) . In the same article the local vet (who was initially suspected to have been infected himself in the 2007 outbreak but was then cleared, and who was also the one who had identified a previous outbreak of H5N1 in 1992 on a site owned by Bernard Matthews) is quoted as saying:
The poultry industry has a very proactive attitude to biosecurity.... Things have gone up a gear since H5N1 and if anything we expected that the first case would be in a free-range flock in contact with wildfowl not an indoor flock like this so how the infection got into the premises is still a surprise. It really is incredibly sad for the company involved ... [as it] is an excellent company with an excellent record of biosecurity and welfare.
This then presented a puzzle to the predominant metaphorical frame of biosecurity discourse where outdoors is hazardous and indoors is safe. Subsequently however, the dominant frame was reasserted. The outbreak, which was first detected in the 'indoor' farm, began in an 'outdoor' free-range farm, but poultry there had not died in sufficient numbers to arouse suspicion. The mystery still remains however, how the virus got from the 'outdoor' farm into the 'indoor' farm. As an information sheet from the Soil Association entitled 'Better out than in' put it:
Nobody could understand how the virus had penetrated the high-biosecurity unit. As a puzzled poultry industry spokesperson said: 'Everyone had expected an outbreak to occur in an outdoor flock first.' As it turned out it had. Following official confirmation in the indoor unit, a vet for two nearby free-range egg flocks alerted Defra to the likelihood that they might have been infected earlier -but in such a mild form that the vet responsible for the free-range flocks had failed to diagnose their symptoms (slow-down in production and slightly raised mortality) as bird flu. (Soil Association 2006) There seem to have been some 'breaches' in biosecurity involving contaminated footwear or foxes carrying the virus from one farm to another. The image of biosecurity as a defensive 'wall' against the invasion of the virus was therefore shattered. In response, one of the farms involved in the outbreak erected a 'real' barrier, 'a customised fence around the perimeter of the farm to keep wild animals off the site' (Heath 2006).
Biosecurity and barriers
The various barriers 'erected' against the virus (to keep it out but also to keep it 'contained') correspond to various hypotheses regarding biosecurity and the transmission of the virus: netting over 'outdoor' flocks is intended to keep the free-range poultry protected from wild birds; keeping birds indoors makes even more sure that they don't get in contact with wild birds; dips and vehicle sprays, as extolled by some farmers interviewed by journalists in 2007 (Cox 2007a) , are supposed to keep the virus from travelling on vehicles and washing, changing clothes and boots, using hand rubs, either soap or alcohol, foot dips and boot scrubbers are intended to prevent the virus from travelling on humans. On top of these 'everyday' biosecurity measures, measures are imposed once an outbreak has occurred, such as 'locking the farm tight' and 'sealing the farm off' (both mentioned in 2006) and the imposition of surveillance, restriction and exclusion zones. These measures are supposed to prevent the virus from travelling or spreading across the country and beyond.
The indoor-outdoor mystery deepened in 2007 when H5N1 was found on a site owned by Bernard Matthews. As one article wrote at the time:
It is an irony not lost on poultry farmers that a disease thought most likely to strike free-range flocks has broken out indoors. If indoors is the right term for a structure that resembles an aircraft hangar, on a vast site that is itself a former airfield. (Proctor 2007b) However, there was another mystery related to space, this time not the indooroutdoor space related to the image schema of a container but the issue of distance, proximity and movement along a rather long trajectory or route spreading far across the whole of Europe.
The near-far conundrum
Speculations about transmission routes were rife both in 2006 and 2007, but were much more intense in 2007, as the focus shifted away from the indoor-outdoor dichotomy to the near-far and import-export dichotomies. The link between Hungary and the UK was detected in the form of a '[w]rapper found in the factory in Holton, identifying a Hungarian slaughterhouse' (Cox 2007b) . This wrapper was a trace in space encapsulating metonymically the whole spatial network of poultry production.
Unlike in 2006, when migration routes of wildfowl were still seen as the main route of virus transmission, the movement of poultry across the globe became the centre of attention in 2007, just as 'long distance' animal movements (Proctor 2007b) had been found to have spread FMD in 2001 and 'poultry-to-poultry transmission' became the focus of attention in 2007. Bernard Matthews' import and export business was allowed to continue despite the avian flu outbreak, only stopping after investigators decided it might have been the route which brought bird flu into the UK. (Yallop 2007) It appears that, just as in 2001, during the FMD crisis, there had been no immediate ban on animal movements. And, again, as during the FMD crisis, this outbreak made consumers more aware of the extensive movements of animals and animal products involved in the production of cheap food, such as, in this case, 'frozen breaded [turkey] products' (Miles 2007 ) and the biosecurity risks that such long-distance movements might pose (Nerlich 2004) . People became aware not only of what got into animals (such as viruses, and antibiotics) and into humans (cheap food and perhaps viruses and antibiotics) but also how animals move around along a very long food chain before getting into the human body as the final container. And along that chain there were various 'leaking' containers that let the virus travel, from farms and slaughterhouses to waste bins and roofs and from lorries to 'leaking' dead animals.
For some time people were able to project biosecurity lapses onto a far-away eastern country and deflect blame from 'us' onto 'them', echoing the way that the east has regularly been depicted as alien or threatening (Neumann 1999) . However, soon proximity issues re-emerged and superseded issues related to distance. According to the DEFRA report, Bernard Matthews' plant comprises a turkey slaughterhouse, two poultry processing plants and 22 barns that are located quite near to each other. The processing plants handled 4,657 tonnes of meat in the month before the outbreak, including 256 tonnes from two sources in Hungary, primarily breast meat that was simply trimmed at the plant (Naughton 2007). With the re-establishment of a coherent story as to how the securitised boundary could be breached and how contaminants from a former eastern bloc country could have arrived, the puzzle then became how the pathogen had moved from one part of the complex to another. The proximity between the farm and the processing plant might have made it possible for the virus to get in or, expressed differently, it might have made it more difficult for bioscurity measures to keep it out. Sir David King, the then government chief scientific advisor pointed out:
At the processing plant there is a question of what is done with the waste product. There is a possibility that it may be open to wild birds or vermin which could carry it into the huts. (Parker 2007) And David Miliband, the then Environmental Secretary, said: 'Infection could have entered the turkey sheds carried from waste products by birds or rodents or on footwear and clothing' (Smith 2007) . The initial DEFRA report blamed the company 'for leaving meat waste in uncovered bins, leaking roofs on turkey sheds and allowing plastic bags containing raw meat juices to blow around the site' (Durrant 2007) .
The issue of biosecurity therefore had to be reconceptualised. It was no longer possible to blame wild birds and outdoor farms, that is, neighbouring 'others' for spreading the virus (Joffe 1999) . While one possible route of transmission did involve movement into the UK from Hungary, it was also no longer possible to blame distant and unhygienic 'others' in any simple way for infecting high-security premises. The problem was conceived as lying in gaps or wholes or openings located in adjacent objects and spaces and the movement between them on the premises themselves (Donaldson and Murakami Wood 2007) . This lead to a blurring of boundaries, both spatial and metaphorical, between near and far, us and them, wild and domesticated, food and waste.
Biosecurity, great and small
The restrictions imposed in 2006 seem to have been followed without provoking too many complaints. This was different in 2007, when small free-range poultry keepers began to complain and apportion blame:
It is very upsetting to have to keep your healthy birds inside. They should be worrying less about that and more about the biosecurity at Bernard Matthews and the gulls and rodents that have been getting in. (Smith 2007) Again, this was an issue of inside and outside, but also of big farmers against small farmers, something that came to the fore in the use of spatial metonymies. People complained that free-range chickens had to be 'shut up in their pens', but that 'they are letting live birds in to Bernard Matthews' (Munford 2007). Here 'Bernard Matthews' stands for the sheds that house birds owned by the company called Bernard Matthews, which is owned by a person called Bernard Matthews. And: 'A lot of little people's livelihoods are involved. H5N1 has only been found in the big people and yet the little people have to suffer' (Munford 2007.) Here a person/ name stands for the farm itself and the livestock kept on it. The 'big people' stands for 'Bernard Matthews', which stands for the poultry 'in which' H5N1 has been found.
The issue of indoor and outdoor is here combined with that of small and big farms or little people versus big corporations. A similar dichotomy is, for example, exploited on the website of a famous organic farm, Sheepdrove Organic Farm, which stated at the time of the Bernard Matthews outbreak: 'Spreading infection from wild birds and backyard poultry are really just ways in which the poultry industry tries to put the blame on others -the small people!' (Grain 2006; Sheepdrove 2007) The events therefore enabled some participants to reconfigure the narrative of transmission. It was no longer a matter of wild birds to free-range to indoor flocks. Outdoor producers and their supporters were able to mobilise a different story, yet one that alludes to familiar tropes of national and local boundaries. In this account, it is the global trade in poultry itself which desecuritises us against disease.
If the main purpose of biosecurity is to 'keep the virus out', then biosecurity failed both in 2006 and 2007, as in both cases the virus 'slipped under the radar' (Kelly 2006) . Both outbreaks were, however, quickly brought under control, but farms reopened for business at quite a different pace. As one free-range farmer pointed out metonymically, again highlighting the difference between indooroutdoor and small-large: 'We don't want to open until we know where the disease has come from and we know that it is safe. He 
Conclusions
Not surprisingly, the discourses of biosecurity identified in the local press coverage focused on the local worries caused by disease coming in from peripheries. The ideal of territoriality is presented while simultaneously reflecting on deterritorialisation as a response (King 2002) . We also saw in many responses to journalists a defence of the safety of both the poultry industry and the local nature of the industry. This ties in with recent research on the defensive localism exhibited by alternative food networks or food movements (see Hinrichs 2003; Winter 2003) , although, in our case, the focus on localness was also expressed by those involved in very well-established traditional food networks.
Waever's (1995) original account of securitisation proposed that the notion of security was broadening beyond its original meaning of state defence to include social, environmental and political issues. In the material presented here we have seen the dilemmas that arise in deciding what is the best available response to biosecurity concerns: the free movement of goods and resources across boundaries demanded by a liberalised economic agenda or the maintenance of boundaries. Questions of the desirability of transnational movements of poultry products, the length of time for which farms should be isolated and the length of time for which birds should be confined indoors all allude to the theme of 'inside' versus 'outside' and the relative risks presented. Consistent with the securitisation thesis, we can see the metaphors of security from the domain of politics, where risks from outside -another country, migrating wild birds, outdoor poultry, people, materials or animals entering the sterile world of the indoor poultry shed -are dominant (Chilton 1996) . Securitisation revolves around discourses of fear (Hyndman 2007 ) and these are used to underwrite the allocation of resources to manage risk by fortifying boundaries. As Turner (2007) points out, the contemporary global economy with movements of people, products and services has paradoxically led to an ever greater preoccupation with the control of boundaries and the enclavement of potentially hazardous or vulnerable things, in our case poultry.
The Eastern Daily Press coverage focused on the ideal strategies of separation and containment (biosecurity) between nations, farm premises of different types (indooroutdoor, large-small, factory-farm) and also animals of different types (such as poultry, wild fowl and foxes). Alongside discussion of actual and possible barriers is a focus on the flow of people (including migrant workers), products and wildlife between (in and out of) spaces, including other nations, farm premises, processing plants and poultry sheds. The 'risk' of trade as a conduit for infection is countered by the identification of globalisation as a source of incoming wealth (from poultry companies) and outgoing scientific and agricultural expertise by which disease can be controlled.
The versatility of this suite of metaphors of boundaries and of 'outside' and 'inside' is attested by the fact that it could be extended to accommodate different possible explanations. Whether the disease had come from wild birds and outdoor poultry or from meat imported from Hungary, the themes of securitisation and boundaries were deployed and risks were formulated as emerging from a potentially contaminated world outside the poultry house.
The extent to which this pattern of argumentation and the use of spatial language, which maps language and culture onto the spatial politics of disease management, can be stretched beyond our case study of local newspaper coverage into other contexts is an empirical question that will have to be addressed in the future. Note * Corresponding author.
